This paper examines the problems with temporal synchronization in video watermarking and describes a new method for efficient synchronization and resynchronization. In our method, efficient synchronization is achieved by designing temporal redundancy in the structure of the watermark. Temporal redundancy allows the watermark detector to establish and maintain synchronization without performing extensive search in the watermark key space. Our method does not use synchronization templates that may be subject to attack and increase the visibility of the watermark. Another advantage of our technique is that the watermark structure is video-dependent, which enhances security.
INTRODUCTION
Many blind watermark detection techniques (including the correlation-based detectors often used in spread-spectrum watermarks [1, 2] ) require the detector to be synchronized with the watermarked signal before reliable watermark detection can occur. Synchronization is the process of identifying the correspondence between the spatial and temporal coordinates of the watermarked signal and that of an embedded watermark. Ideally, the watermark detector will be given a watermarked signal such that the coordinates of the embedded watermark have not been changed since the embedding process. In this case, synchronization is trivial and the detector can proceed in the manner prescribed by the watermark detection technique [3] . However, if the coordinates of the embedded watermark have been changed (such as when the watermarked signal is rescaled, rotated, translated, and cropped as shown on Figure 1 ) the detector must identify the coordinates of the watermark prior to detection. Synchronization is crucial to successful watermark detection and if the detector cannot synchronize with its input signal, an embedded watermark may not be detectable even though it is present in the signal. Many of the techniques that are used to attack watermarked signals do not "remove" the watermark, as widely believed, but desynchronize the detector [4, 5] .
Synchronization is a problem that cannot be ignored in most video watermarking applications, even in the absence of a malicious attacker. In applications such as secure digital television and broadcast monitoring, the watermark detector may be expected to detect the watermark starting from any arbitrary temporal location within the video signal (as opposed to starting detection from the "beginning" of the video signal), which is known as initial synchronization. In other applications, the video signal arriving at the watermark detector may have been damaged to the extent that the detector loses synchronization and must resynchronize before watermark detection can resume. One such application is streaming video [6, 7, 8] , where parts of the video signal can be damaged or lost as it is transmitted over a network. The video signal may also be interrupted for an indeterminate time for reasons beyond the control of the user, such as network congestion. (We note that in video streaming, the network is not under any constraint to preserve the perceptual quality of the video.) In these applications, it is essential that the watermark detector can resynchronize to the video, even after many frames of the video have been lost. Obviously, robust watermarking techniques should be robust against synchronization attacks by a hostile attacker.
In the worst case, establishing synchronization would involve an exhaustive search over the space of all possible geometric and temporal transformations to find the watermark. This is not practical for video watermarking applications that require real-time watermark detection. Methods for spatial synchronization in still images (see [9] for an overview) have been examined and typically involve efficient search techniques to deduce the geometric transformation or the use of embedding domains that are invariant to geometric transformations. However, some still-image watermark synchronization techniques are too computationally expensive for real-time video applications, and those still-image techniques that are suitably efficient for real-time implementation do not consider temporal synchronization.
One oft-mentioned synchronization technique is the embedding of a pattern, known as a template, which a detector can examine to determine the orientation and scale of the watermark. (Templates have been suggested for video watermark synchronization [1, 10] .) There are several disadvantages to template embedding. First, a template is designed to be easily detected; hence the template itself can be vulnerable to removal [11] . Second, the template must be robustly embedded into the video signal that could introduce additional distortion in the watermarked video.
In this paper, we consider the problem of temporal synchronization in video watermarking and temporal attacks. (These issues can also apply for time-varying signals other than video, such as audio.) Spatial synchronization issues, such as synchronization after rotation, scaling, translation, and cropping attacks, is not considered here. A method for synchronization in the presence of spatial shifts is described in [12] . The inclusion of the temporal coordinate dramatically increases the potential search space necessary for synchronization in video as compared to still images. More significantly, however, the temporal redundancy that is present in most video sequences can be exploited in attacks against watermarked video that are not possible for still images, such as frame cropping, insertion, transposition, and frame averaging (temporal collusion.)
We will propose a method (or protocol) in the design of video watermarks that allows efficient temporal synchronization by introducing redundancy in the structure of the embedded watermark. Our work exploits the use of frame dependent watermarks [13, 14] . The detection mechanism takes advantage of the redundancy to reduce the search required for synchronization. The method does not involve the embedding of templates and generates a watermark that is dependent on the content of the video.
It is important to note that our new method is independent of the actual watermarking technique (embedder and detector). In fact our method could be retrofitted into most existing video watermarking techniques.
FRAMEWORK FOR TEMPORAL SYNCHRONIZATION
When a watermark is embedded into a signal, a parameter that defines its structure is the embedding key K E . The watermark can also be dependent on other factors. Some watermarking techniques embed side information into the watermark, known the message or payload. Other watermarking techniques vary the watermark based on the unwatermarked signal itself, such as by using a visual model during embedding [3] . We assume the embedder uses K E to generate a key schedule, or a sequence of sub-keys that are used to watermark individual frames of the video. For notation, let K(t) be the key used to generate the watermark for frame t. The goal of the detector is to determine K(t) when frame t is examined. If the detector can determine K(t), temporal synchronization is (or has been) achieved. If the detector cannot determine K(t), synchronization is lost. For simplicity, we focus on symmetric watermarking techniques in this discussion, where the embedding and corresponding detection keys are identical.
This framework, or model, is applicable to a large class of video watermarking techniques (including [1, 2, 10, 12, 13, 15] ) and is not as restrictive as it may seem. For example, many watermarking techniques use the same watermark key for each frame, so the key schedule becomes K(0) = K(1) = K(t) = K E . Other techniques use a completely different key to watermark each frame. For video watermarking techniques that use K E as a seed for to a pseudo-random number generator, the key schedule corresponds to the state of the pseudo-random number generator at the start of each frame.
Temporal Redundancy
The amount of temporal redundancy in the key schedule can have a dramatic effect on the ease of synchronization and watermark security. In this context, temporal redundancy refers to the degree of randomness in the individual keys appearing in the watermark key schedule: A high degree of randomness corresponds to low temporal redundancy and a low degree of randomness corresponds to high temporal redundancy. Special cases are used to illustrate the security and synchronization trade-offs ( One type of key schedule is to use a single embedding key K E = K 0 to watermark all video frames, this is known as timeinvariant key watermarks. The embedded watermark itself may be time-varying even though the same key is used to watermark all frames. Temporal synchronization in such watermarks is a trivial problem because the detector is not required to search for the proper detection key. However, security may be a concern, particularly if the watermark is also timeinvariant and susceptible to a temporal correlation attack to deduce the watermark (an example exploiting such a security vulnerability was demonstrated in [13] .) These watermarks have high temporal redundancy in the key sequence (thus, synchronization is simple) but relatively low security.
Another type of key schedule is to use independent keys to generate the embedded watermark for each frame. Strictly speaking, the watermark keys K(i) and K(j), i≠j, cannot be truly independent because all the keys in the key schedule are related to the embedding key K E . This class of watermarks refers to those techniques whose keys do not repeat or repeat with an extremely long period. The watermarks embedded in successive frames of the video are uncorrelated, which is desirable from a security standpoint but undesirable in terms of robustness as an attacker can perform temporal collusion (frame averaging) to remove the watermark. In addition, because attacks such as frame insertion and dropping remove the correspondence between the frame index t and the detection key K(t), these attacks successfully desynchronize a naive detector. Recovering synchronization after it has been lost may involve a search over a large key space and could be nearly impossible to perform efficiently. These watermarks have little or no temporal redundancy in the key sequence (thus, synchronization is difficult) but relatively high security.
In a periodic key watermark, the keys form a repeating sequence (with relatively short period.) Recovering synchronization from these watermarks is not difficult because the detector can restrict the search to a discrete, countable set of keys. For example, one method of synchronization recovery is to search for K 0 if synchronization is lost. Periodic key watermarks do not possess the same degree of security as an independent key watermark but resynchronization is practical even though not all the keys are identical.
The time-invariant key and periodic key watermarks indicate that efficient synchronization and resynchronization are possible if some degree of temporal redundancy is present in the watermark key schedule. Our technique focuses on the construction of a key schedule possessing temporal redundancy for efficient synchronization. The detector synchronizes by performing a limited search in the key space. This class of detectors is in contrast with detectors that embed side-information for synchronization, such as templates. Time-invariant key watermarks, independent key watermarks, and periodic key watermarks are special cases in our technique.
A PROTOCOL FOR TEMPORAL SYNCHRONIZATION

Watermark Embedding Protocol
Our technique for generating the key schedule at the watermark embedder is illustrated in Figure 3 , consisting of four principal components: Watermark embedder, temporal redundancy control, feature extractor, and key generator. Watermark Embedder: The watermark embedder accepts as inputs a frame of the original (unwatermarked) video, an embedding key, and any other side information necessary to embed the watermark into the current frame. The embedding key is supplied from the temporal redundancy control component. Any watermark embedding technique suitable under the assumptions described in section 2 can be used.
Input
Temporal Redundancy Control:
This is the primary means of controlling the amount of temporal redundancy in the key schedule. Temporal redundancy is added to the key schedule by using a single key to watermark multiple frames of the video. Three parameters are used to define the key schedule: The master embedding key K E is used as the initial key to generate the key schedule. The period, α, is the number of frames watermarked before the key generator is reset. The repeat, β, is the number of consecutive frames that are watermarked with the same key before a new key is generated (1 ≤ β ≤ α).
The functionality of the temporal redundancy control is shown below:
Watermark Embedding Procedure (WEP)
1. Set a=0, b=0, K=K E , reset the key generator state. 2. Read a frame of the input video.
3. Send the current key K to the watermark embedder to watermark the current frame. If b=β, continue to step 6. Otherwise, go to step 2. 6. Use the feature extractor and key generator (both described below) to create a new key K for subsequent frames, set b=0, and go to step 2. Figure 4 illustrates an example key schedule for the case of α=8 and β=2, with frames depicted in the same shades indicating the same key is used to watermark those frames. Every two consecutive frames are watermarked with the same key. The watermark key is reset to K E every 8 frames, so frames 0, 1, 8, and 9 are watermarked with key K E . The key used to watermark frames 2 and 3 is not necessarily identical to the key used to watermark frames 10 and 11. (The name "period" for α is somewhat a misnomer because the key schedule is not periodic in general.) α=8, β=2 The period parameter α controls the degree of global redundancy in the key schedule, as it determines how frequently the watermark key generator is reset and K E is used for embedding the watermark. The frames that are embedded with key K E are known as resynchronization frames because the detector can search for K E when it is lost. These frames also provide synchronization points when the detector performs initial synchronization. Increasing α decreases the frequency when K E is embedded, thus reducing the temporal redundancy in the watermark. A key schedule generated by α=1 corresponds to embedding with key K E for every frame, or a time-invariant key watermark.
The repeat parameter β controls the degree of local redundancy in the key schedule. A high repeat factor corresponds to increased redundancy and decreased key rate (number of distinct keys used for watermarking embedding per unit time.) Increased local redundancy is beneficial for resisting temporal attacks, such as frame dropping, transposition, and averaging.
As the experiments will show, a key schedule having minimal local redundancy (large α, β=1) has similar behavior to an independent key watermark and can be desynchronized by frame averaging and deletion attack.
As mentioned in section 2, the embedding key is just one parameter used to determine the embedded watermark, and frames watermarked by the same key do not necessarily imply that the embedded watermark signals in those frames are identical. One example is the technique in [13] , which creates image-dependent watermark signals using a time-invariant key.
Feature Extraction: Feature extraction allows the key schedule to be video dependent. It is invoked when a new watermark key is needed (step 6 of the WEP shown above) and is inactive during other times. The feature extractor examines the watermarked image and outputs a vector of features that is made available to the key generator.
For robust video watermarking, the features should change in value only when significant alterations are made to the watermarked frame. In our technique, it is possible to destroy temporal synchronization by performing spatial attacks on video frames because the key schedule is video-dependent. Ideally, the features are sufficiently robust so that such an attack is successful only when the attacked video no longer has any value in the application. The features should also resist (or be invariant to) spatial synchronization attacks and be computationally efficient. In particular, if real-time embedding or detection is required by an application, the feature extraction process must also be in real-time.
The features themselves should be kept secret and known only to the embedder and detector. For security, the feature values can involve K E or an auxiliary key.
Key Generator: The key generator is used to create new watermarking keys in the key schedule. The key generator, which is in general a state machine, is involved in steps 1 and 6 in the WEP. During step 1, the state of the key generator is reset to a predefined initial state. This is necessary so the watermark detector (which uses an identical key generator) will be able to recover the key sequence. In step 6, the key generator creates a new key using its current state information and input from the feature extractor. The state of the key generator can also change in step 6. During other steps of the WEP, the key generator is inactive.
The method of generating keys for future watermarks based on the current key and features also adds temporal redundancy in the key schedule. One way of viewing the operation of the key generator is that of a predictor, in which future watermark keys are predicted from current and past watermark keys. If the future keys are completely random (that is, there is no temporal redundancy) then the detector will not be able to determine the key schedule without extensive search through the key space. However, if future keys are chosen in a way such that they can be deduced (or predicted) by the of current and past keys and features, the detector will be able to identify the key schedule without performing a search.
One type of key generator is a finite state machine (FSM). One state in the FSM is identified as the initial state. Each state has an associated key transition function, or a description of how to generate the next key from the current key. Key transition functions can take as inputs the current key, the master key K E , the feature vector supplied by the feature extractor, and other side-information (for example, message payload). State transitions are (in general) dependent on the feature values, however the key generators for time-invariant key and periodic key watermarks can be implemented as trivial FSMs that do not depend on features. Figure 5 shows an example FSM key generator that uses three features (X, Y, and Z) from the feature extractor. The initial state is state zero. The key transition functions are shown with each state, and with the exception of states 0 and 2, involve the current key value and the value of one of the features (c1, c2, and c3 are constants.) In state 2, the next key is generated by performing binary negation on the current key. The feature (X, Y, or Z) that has greatest value determines the state transitions. Figure 5 . An example key generator using a finite state machine Like the feature extractor, the structure of the key generator is a shared secret between the embedder and detector. The key generator can also be dependent on K E or an auxiliary key, such as by using key-dependent key transition functions or key-dependent state machines.
Max(X,Y,Z) =
The flexibility of the key generator and feature extraction components provides a great deal of generality that can be exploited by the application or the degree of security needed. In this paper, we chose a simple set of features and a trivial FSM key generator ( Figure 5 ) to implement the protocol and evaluate its performance while varying the temporal redundancy parameters (α, β). In future work, issues regarding the development of the feature extractor and key generator, such the design criteria for maximizing robustness and security of the embedded watermark, will be studied.
Computational Cost of the Embedding Protocol:
The computational costs for watermark embedding can be critical in realtime implementations. By examination of the WEP, the worst-case computational cost is on the order of (WE + FE + KG) per frame, where WE is the computational cost for watermark embedding, FE is the computational cost for feature extraction, and KG is the computational cost for key generation.
Watermark Detection Protocol
The watermark detection protocol uses the watermark detector and a queue to perform temporal synchronization. Figure  6 shows the watermark detection protocol. The watermark detector in Figure 6 is the detector that corresponds to the technique used to embed the watermark into frames of the video. The feature extraction and key generator components are identical to those components in the watermark embedding protocol.
Test
The memory is a queue that is used to perform the search for establishing and maintaining temporal synchronization. Each entry in the queue stores a watermark key and the state of the key generator, or a (key, state) tuple. The watermark detection procedure is as follows:
Watermark Detection Procedure (WDP) 1. The detector is initialized with an empty queue. 2. Read a frame of the input video. 3. Attempt to detect the watermark by using: a. The key K E , and, b. Every key that is stored in the queue. 4. If no watermark is found during step 3, go to step 2 to try detecting a watermark in the next frame. 5. If the watermark detected did not correspond to key K E , that key must already be present in the queue. Move that (key, state) tuple from its place to the head (front) of the queue. 6. Perform feature extraction on the watermarked image. 7. With the feature values obtained in step 6 and the state stored in the queue (use the initial state if K E was detected) as inputs to the key generator, find (next key, next state) and insert (next key, next state) into the front of the queue. Because the queue is of finite size, this can cause the tuple at the tail of the queue to be lost. 8. Go to step 2 to read the watermark in the next frame.
In essence, the queue stores the most recently detected watermark keys and their corresponding next keys. A larger queue size (number of entries in the queue) allows more "history" in the key sequence to be kept and may provide increased robustness against frame transposition attacks. A transposition attack involves interchanging frames of the video, so it is possible that the embedded watermark in a frame comes from a key observed in the past. However, the gain provided by a large queue is subject to diminishing returns and large queues also increase the computational cost for processing one frame of the video.
The detector does not require knowledge of the embedder's temporal redundancy parameters (α and β) as sideinformation because the search performed during step 3 of the WDP allows the watermark to be detected without a priori knowledge of the correspondence between the key and the frame index. This is also beneficial for resilience against temporal attacks such as frame deletion, insertion, and transposition, which can be thought of as causing "jitters" in the key sequence. Also note that unlike the watermark embedder, the feature extraction and key generator components may be active during every frame in the detector. The only frames that do not involve the use of the feature extractor and key generator are those in which no watermark can be found.
Computational Cost of the Detection Protocol:
The most significant portion of the computational cost is incurred during the watermark detections of step 3 of the WDP. The computational cost is on the order of (((Q+1) x WD) + FE + KG) per frame, where Q is the queue size, WD is the computational cost for watermark detection, FE is the computational cost for feature extraction, and KG is the computational cost for key generation. If FE and KG are computationally efficient, this reflects a linear increase in the computation costs for simple watermark detection. Furthermore, the multiple watermark detections for the key search may be implemented as parallel computations if necessary to fulfill real-time constraints.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have implemented both the watermark embedding and detection protocols using a simple video watermarking technique. The watermark is a zero-mean Gaussian pseudo-random signal that is added to the luminance pixel values of each frame. The watermark key is used as the seed to the random number generator. The chrominance samples in each video frame were not watermarked. Detection is performed by using a filter to reduce the effect of the original image (as suggested in [12] ) followed by correlation with the watermark signal. If the correlation exceeds a threshold value, the watermark is successfully detected in the frame.
The feature extractor partitions each frame into blocks (32x32 pixels in size) and randomly assigns each block to set X, Y, or Z. (This assignment occurs once, and the same block assignments are used for all frames of the video.) To obtain the feature value X for a particular frame, the average luminance of all blocks assigned to set X is found and then quantized (to make the feature value less sensitive to noise.) A similar procedure is used for the features Y and Z. These features are then used as inputs to the FSM key generator shown in Figure 5 . These features and the key generator were used because they are simple to implement and computationally efficient. It is realized that they may not be optimal for either security or robustness.
Three 352x288 uncompressed CIF videos (Foreman, Akiyo, and Bus) were watermarked with varying amounts of temporal redundancy and then attacked. Temporal redundancy was varied by adjusting the period (α) and repeat (β) parameters during embedding. After the attack, the percentage of watermarked frames successfully detected was measured as the performance measure. A percentage of 100% indicates that the attack was completely ineffective at desynchronizing the detector while 0% indicates that the attack rendered the watermark undetectable. Ten trials were performed for each video and set of redundancy parameters and the mean detection results of all trials and videos are shown in the results below. Unless otherwise noted, the queue size used was 10 entries. Figure 7 shows the performance of the technique after the video is attacked by dropping frames at random. Each frame in the video sequence has a fixed probability (0.05, 0.25, and 0.50) of being dropped (independent of the decision to drop other frames in the video). If there is no local redundancy in the key sequence (β=1 frame), the performance of the technique is poor. However, if some local redundancy is introduced (β=5, 10 frames) the detector is capable of maintaining synchronization and detecting a significant portion of the watermark even if 50% of the frames of the video had been lost. As expected, the rate of successful watermark detection decreases as the amount of temporal redundancy in the key schedule is decreased.
The technique is very effective against the insertion of unwatermarked frames, as shown on Figure 8 . In this attack, frames of the original (unwatermarked) video are randomly inserted between frames of the watermarked video. The insertion of watermarked frames resembles a transposition attack, which is discussed next. Between each pair of frames (denoted Wa and Wb) in the watermarked video, the attacker inserts a single frame of the original video (denoted frame O) with fixed probability P. If a frame is inserted (so the video frame sequence appears as Wa-O-Wb) the attacker considers adding additional frames between frame O and frame Wb with an equal probability P for each additional frame. The results show that the attacker can insert an arbitrary number of unwatermarked video frames into the sequence and synchronization will be maintained. The contents of the inserted frames are irrelevant as long as they are unwatermarked (so they could be frames from the original video or some other arbitrary set of images.) The performance is not at all surprising because the state of the queue is not changed if no watermark is detected in a given video frame. Figure 9 and Figure 10 show the performance against local frame transposition attack. In this attack, the watermarked video is scanned from the first frame to the last with each frame having a fixed probability (P=5%, 25%, 50%) of being interchanged with another (target) frame in the local neighborhood of the candidate frame. We chose the target frame by generating a Gaussian random number (σ 2 =5.0), dropping fractions, and treating the number as a relative time index where 0 is the current frame, -1 is one frame in the past, +1 is one frame in the future, and so on. Because transposing a frame with itself does not accomplish anything, we choose another random number if the relative time index is zero. The performance of the technique shows the same general trend as the frame dropping attack. By comparing Figure 9 and Figure 10 , decreasing the queue size from 10 entries to 4 entries does not affect the performance for low transposition rates (P=5%) but the performance can fall more sharply for larger transposition rates (P=50%).
The next attack examined was frame averaging. In this attack, a window of fixed size (2, 3, and 4 frames) was swept temporally across the video. At each step, a composite frame was constructed by computing, for each spatial location, the average pixel value over all the frames in the window. As Figure 11 shows, the frame averaging process reduces the detection rate considerably. The primary culprit for the decrease in performance is the poor choice of features in our implementation. (Frame averaging can change pixel values greatly, particularly for video where a lot of motion occurs.) However, if sufficient local redundancy is present the detector can still detect watermarks in 50% of the frames of the video despite the poor feature selection. As expected, a key schedule with little local redundancy is not very resilient against averaging attack.
Lastly, a combined attack was executed which consisted of the following attacks in order (each attack carried out with probability P): frame insertion, frame transposition, frame dropping, and frame averaging with a window size of 3. The performance under the combined attack is shown on Figure 12 . After the attacks (and with the visual quality of the video being quite poor) the detector is still capable of detecting a portion of the watermarked frames in the video if sufficient temporal redundancy is present in the key schedule.
IMPROVEMENTS AND FURTHER WORK
The results presented in section 4 show that if sufficient temporal redundancy is present in the key schedule, the watermark can maintain synchronization despite the presence of frame dropping, insertion, transposition, and averaging attacks. However, the technique has a lot of room for improving watermark robustness and security.
In our implementation, one of the primary reasons why the detection performance was decreased after frame averaging is the feature selection used in the feature extractor. The features we used have the advantage of low computational cost but did not possess the desired amount of robustness. Sometimes, the detector was not able to create the same key schedule that was used to embed the watermark after frames were averaged because the feature values changed after the averaging attack. By finding and using more robust features, the performance against frame averaging can be improved.
Another method for improving our implementation is to adapt the temporal redundancy of the watermark with the temporal redundancy of the video, instead of using the α and β constants. To illustrate the problem, consider the watermark key schedule shown on Figure 4 and a rapidly changing video. The watermark key used for frames 4 and 5 are dependent on the feature values obtained in frame 3. However, if the feature values change rapidly (in particular, if the feature values change between frames 2 and 3) the detector must receive frame 3 to recover the key sequence used for frames 4 to 7. Because the feature values have changed, frame 2 does not carry any information about the key in frames 4-7. If frame 3 is dropped then the detector will not be able to generate the key schedule for frames 4-7. (In effect, this represents a loss of temporal redundancy.) Instead of using α and β, the embedder can perform feature extraction in every frame for the purpose of deciding when to change the watermark key. The key is changed only after feature values are constant over a certain number of frames. In this manner, the watermark embedder can ensure that some temporal redundancy is available before the key is changed. This can significantly improve the performance against frame dropping and frame averaging.
Several improvements can be made to increase security. One of the foremost improvements is to make the embedded watermark in resynchronization frames strongly image-dependent (using the technique described in [13] or some other method.) This prevents an attacker from using correlation to identify those frames. Another improvement is to embed resynchronization frames in non-uniformly spaced intervals (do not use α), which also complicates the process of identifying the resynchronization frames for the attacker. Lastly, the key generator needs to be examined more closely and other key generators or key transition functions should be considered. For example, one may consider the use of cryptographic hashes in key transition functions K i+1 =hash(K E , K i , features). Such key transition functions preserve the temporal redundancy of the key schedule but scatter the keys throughout the key space instead of localizing the keys near K E . The hash function taking K E as an argument makes it necessary for an attacker to have knowledge of K E and not just K i to deduce the key schedule.
In addition to improving the robustness and security, more temporal attack methods should be studied, including frame decimation and frame-rate conversion (temporal re-sampling), 3:2 pulldown and interlacing, and motion-compensated frame averaging. We are also interested in using the technique on compressed video.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper describes a method for efficient temporal synchronization and resynchronization for video watermarking. With sufficient temporal redundancy in the key schedule, the embedded watermark can be resilient against temporal attack such as frame dropping, insertion, transposition, and averaging. It was shown that a watermark with no temporal redundancy in the key schedule is not resilient against temporal attacks. This method also addresses initial synchronization and resynchronization. Synchronization was performed without the use of template embedding, however the technique presented does not preclude the use of templates. Our new method is independent of the actual watermarking technique (embedder and detector) and could be retrofitted into most existing video watermarking techniques. 
